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Abstract
Background: Digital contact tracing apps have the potential to augment contact tracing systems and disrupt COVID-19
transmission by rapidly identifying secondary cases prior to the onset of infectiousness and linking them into a system of quarantine,
testing, and health care worker case management. The international experience of digital contact tracing apps during the COVID-19
pandemic demonstrates how challenging their design and deployment are.
Objective: This study aims to derive and summarize best practice guidance for the design of the ideal digital contact tracing
app.
Methods: A collaborative cross-disciplinary approach was used to derive best practice guidance for designing the ideal digital
contact tracing app. A search of the indexed and gray literature was conducted to identify articles describing or evaluating digital
contact tracing apps. MEDLINE was searched using a combination of free-text terms and Medical Subject Headings search terms.
Gray literature sources searched were the World Health Organization Institutional Repository for Information Sharing, the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control publications library, and Google, including the websites of many health
protection authorities. Articles that were acceptable for inclusion in this evidence synthesis were peer-reviewed publications,
cohort studies, randomized trials, modeling studies, technical reports, white papers, and media reports related to digital contact
tracing.
Results: Ethical, user experience, privacy and data protection, technical, clinical and societal, and evaluation considerations
were identified from the literature. The ideal digital contact tracing app should be voluntary and should be equitably available
and accessible. User engagement could be enhanced by small financial incentives, enabling users to tailor aspects of the app to
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their particular needs and integrating digital contact tracing apps into the wider public health information campaign. Adherence
to the principles of good data protection and privacy by design is important to convince target populations to download and use
digital contact tracing apps. Bluetooth Low Energy is recommended for a digital contact tracing app's contact event detection,
but combining it with ultrasound technology may improve a digital contact tracing app's accuracy. A decentralized
privacy-preserving protocol should be followed to enable digital contact tracing app users to exchange and record temporary
contact numbers during contact events. The ideal digital contact tracing app should define and risk-stratify contact events according
to proximity, duration of contact, and the infectiousness of the case at the time of contact. Evaluating digital contact tracing apps
requires data to quantify app downloads, use among COVID-19 cases, successful contact alert generation, contact alert receivers,
contact alert receivers that adhere to quarantine and testing recommendations, and the number of contact alert receivers who
subsequently are tested positive for COVID-19. The outcomes of digital contact tracing apps' evaluations should be openly
reported to allow for the wider public to review the evaluation of the app.
Conclusions: In conclusion, key considerations and best practice guidance for the design of the ideal digital contact tracing app
were derived from the literature.
(JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2021;9(6):e27753) doi: 10.2196/27753
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Introduction
Background
COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic by the World Health
Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020 [1]. COVID-19 has
caused the death of over 3.4 million people worldwide as of
May 26, 2021 [2]. Most people (as high as 80%) infected by
COVID-19 will have no symptoms or mild-to-moderate
symptoms [3,4]. Severe illness and death due to COVID-19 are
more likely to occur with increasing age and comorbidities such
as chronic heart or lung disease [3]. The WHO advise on four
key actions to contain COVID-19: social distancing, rapid
testing of those with symptoms, tracing of case contacts, and
the isolation of suspected and confirmed cases [5]. People with
COVID-19 are thought to be most infectious to others within
the 2 days preceding symptom onset [3,6]. Onward transmission
from individuals in the presymptomatic phase of infection is
considered to be enough to sustain the pandemic even if isolation
of symptomatic cases occurs [6]. This can be mitigated by
stringent social distancing measures, but these come with
considerable socioeconomic costs [7].
An effective “test and trace” system is key if the most restrictive
social distancing measures such as national “stay at home”
orders are to be avoided [8]. Manual contact tracing requires
significant human and logistical resources, and its effectiveness
depends on the availability and proficiency of contact tracing
staff [8,9]. In addition, humans are fallible and prone to recall
bias, meaning that not all contacts may be identified reliably in
retrospect. It is also not possible in many situations to identify
contacts unfamiliar to the case. For contact tracing purposes,
the infectious period is considered to be up to 10 days after
symptom onset and to begin from 2 days before symptom onset
or if the person is asymptomatic from 2 days before testing
[10,11]. The incubation period for COVID-19 can be up to 14
days (and longer in 5% of cases) [12], meaning that not all
contacts are captured by this definition. COVID-19 has a serial
interval as short as 3.2 days; therefore, contact tracing and
quarantine of contacts must be rapid to disrupt transmission
chains [13].
A digital contact tracing app (DCTA) is an app that can detect
and trace other app-carrying individuals who have had contact
with one another that would risk COVID-19 transmission if one
were to be infected. Early in the pandemic, DCTAs were seen
as a potentially innovative solution to contain COVID-19 by
augmenting the effectiveness of manual contact tracing [14].
DCTAs could disrupt transmission chains by rapidly identifying
secondary cases prior to the onset of infectiousness and linking
them into a system of quarantine, testing, and health care worker
case management [8,15-17]. A COVID-19 modeling study from
the United Kingdom estimated that if a DCTA were used by
56% of the population, then the reproductive value of the virus
could be reduced below 1.0, controlling the disease [18]. By
October 13, 2020, there were 120 DCTAs in 71 countries [19],
and within months of digital contact tracing use, some key
challenges became evident.
Global Digital Contact Tracing App Deployment
On March 20, 2020, Singapore became the first country in the
world to launch a national DCTA, TraceTogether [20].
TraceTogether was downloaded by over 1.1 million users within
a month of launching, despite having technical limitations [21].
It required Apple iPhone users to have the app open in the
foreground and caused significant battery drain [21]. In South
Korea, an extensive electronic surveillance system was used.
GPS-enabled location tracking, closed-circuit television
recordings, and credit card transactions were used to aid contact
tracing [22]. How these data were used by health authorities to
warn others of potential exposure to COVID-19 may have
breached the privacy of those infected and contributed to a
growth in social stigma associated with the disease [23]. In
Israel, a network-based mass surveillance system using mobile
phone GPS technology was launched on March 16 to identify
COVID-19 case contacts [24,25]. Authorities in Israel reported
that, after 1 month of surveillance, 36.8% of COVID-19 cases
notified were identified using the surveillance system [25],
although the system did have a false-positive detection rate of
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5% [25]. Significant privacy concerns were raised by opponents
of Israel’s surveillance system, but ultimately, the supreme court
ruled in favor of its use provided it was supported by primary
legislation [24-26]. In Norway, a DCTA that used Bluetooth
Low Energy (LE) and GPS location tracking was launched on
April 16 and was downloaded 1.6 million times [27]. However,
the National Institute of Public Health was forced to abandon
the app after data protection authorities deemed there was no
evidence of its effectiveness to justify location data collection
[27]. Norway remained without a DCTA for several months
thereafter [27]. Qatar mandated the use of its “Ehteraz” DCTA
on May 22, but subsequently, it was discovered that it left the
health status and location data of over 1 million users vulnerable
to cyberattacks [28]. On July 7, the Republic of Ireland (ROI)
launched a national DCTA called COVID Tracker, which is
actively used by 1.3 million people, 34% of those older than 16
years nationally [29]. However, a service update in early August
caused rapid battery depletion and heat issues for some users
[30,31]. This was the primary cause of negative feedback for
COVID Tracker [32]. In the 5-day period after this update,
152,656 uninstalls were registered with 29,049 returning users
recorded [33]. As of May 28th 2021, eleven months after its
release, COVID Tracker has been used by 15,742 people with
COVID-19 to send contact alerts to 24,436 users [29]. In the
United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) COVID-19
app, launched on September 24, had been erroneously notifying
users they were close contacts but provided no further
instructions [34,35]. The international experience of DCTA use
during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how challenging
their design and deployment are. This formed the basis of this
literature review, which aims to derive and summarize best
practice guidance for the design of the ideal DCTA (IDCTA).
Methods
A collaborative cross-disciplinary approach (Multimedia
Appendix 1 [32,36-39]) was used to derive best practice
guidance for designing the IDCTA. The cross-disciplinary team
included specialists from computer science, engineering, clinical
medicine, medical technology, and psychology. A scoping
review to identify considerations described in the emerging
literature on DCTAs was conducted (Multimedia Appendix 2
[8,14,15,36,40-42,44]). After the key considerations were
identified and agreed upon by the cross-disciplinary team, a
detailed evidence synthesis for each was constructed by author
JOC and refined through a review and feedback cycle involving
a subgroup of the cross-disciplinary team. The cycle of review
and feedback was repeated until there was cross-disciplinary
agreement that all feedback had been adequately addressed. The
product of this process was then presented to the wider
cross-disciplinary team for further discussion, from which best
practice guidance for the design of the IDCTA was derived
through a review and feedback cycle.
To construct the evidence synthesis, a literature search was
conducted using Ovid MEDLINE and Epub Ahead of Print,
In-Process, and Other Non-Indexed Citations, Daily and
Versions. Free-text terms and Medical Subject Headings search
terms were used (Multimedia Appendix 3). The WHO
Institutional Repository for Information Sharing [45] and the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
publications library [46] were searched. The gray literature
search (Multimedia Appendix 4) included manually searching
the websites of DCTAs, media sites, and health protection
authorities including but not limited to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (United States of America), Public
Health England, Health Protection Surveillance Centre (ROI),
Robert Koch Institute (Germany), and the Norwegian Institute
of Public Health. Included articles had to describe aspects of
developing or deploying a DCTA. Peer-review publications,
modeling studies, cohort studies, randomized trials, technical
reports, white papers, and media reports were eligible for
inclusion. The references of included articles were also searched
to identify other eligible literature. Both English and non-English




From the scoping review (Multimedia Appendix 2), the
cross-disciplinary team identified and agreed upon six key
considerations for best practice guidance when designing the
IDCTA: (1) ethical considerations, (2) user experience
considerations, (3) privacy and data protection considerations,
(4) technical considerations, (5) clinical and societal
considerations, and (6) evaluation considerations.
The outcome of the literature search shown in Figure 1 and
Multimedia Appendix 5 [14-17,22,23,25,26,32,34,37,
38,40-42,44,47-173] contains a description of the included
studies and their source (indexed literature search, gray
literature, references search).
For each consideration, best practice guidance for the design of
the IDCTA as derived from the literature by the
cross-disciplinary group is summarized.
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Figure 1. Literature search flow diagram.
Ethical Considerations
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
included the right to health [174]. Digital contact tracing can
be viewed as states using their available resources to protect
people’s right to health. However, it may also be viewed as
states interfering with other human rights enshrined in the
Declaration, such as the right to human dignity;
nondiscrimination; equality; privacy; access to information; and
the freedoms of association, assembly, and movement [47,174].
Such interference to protect health may be ethical if it is adherent
to criteria defined by the Siracusa Principles in 1985 [175].
These criteria are that interferences should have a legal basis,
further a legitimate objective of common interest, not disrupt
democratic processes, and not be deployed in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way [175]. These form the most rudimentary
ethical design considerations for the IDCTA.
There are many frameworks through which the ethics of
DCTA’s use can be considered in greater detail. Upshur [48]
described four guiding principles when considering whether a
public health intervention is ethical (the harm principle, the
principle of least restrictive means, the reciprocity principle,
and the transparency principle). Childress et al [49] provide a
set of five justificatory conditions (effectiveness, proportionality,
necessity, least infringement, and public justifications) necessary
for a public health intervention to interfere with individual
liberties. Kass [50] described an ethical framework for public
health interventions based on an assessment of the effectiveness,
potential harms, alternative interventions and options for harm
interventions of the intervention, and whether it is an equitable
intervention. However, the complexity and lack of clarity of
the ethical issues surrounding the relatively recent advent of
digital contact tracing in the context of what was a new rapidly
evolving global pandemic have necessitated frameworks that
specifically address ethical considerations in digital contact
tracing [15,51-56]. An overview of the key ethical
considerations presented in these frameworks is provided in
Multimedia Appendix 6 [15,51-56]. There is considerable
agreement between the frameworks and among early guidance
from the European Commission [57] and digital technology
expert groups [14,58] about the considerations necessary to
design and deploy DCTAs ethically, which broadly can be
described as proportionality, voluntariness, transparency and
trustworthiness, and equity.
Proportionality, that is, ensuring the intervention is a
proportionate response to the public health threat, defines the
ethical limits of other aspects of the IDCTA, such as its clinical
and societal use and its interference with privacy and data
protection rights [14,58,59,176]. There is no doubt that
COVID-19 is a significant threat to public health, as evident
even from early reports [177]. However, to determine if DCTAs
are a proportionate response to this threat, an assessment of
their potential benefits and risks is required. As a key component
of the WHO-advised strategy to counter COVID-19 [5], any
intervention that improves the effectiveness of contact tracing
is of benefit to public health during the pandemic. However,
high-quality evidence that DCTAs are effective in doing this is
lacking [60,61]. Randomized controlled trials are the gold
standard when evaluating the effectiveness of interventions, but
for DCTAs, they may be logistically challenging and costly to
design [62]. Augmenting manual contact tracing through
nondigital means has proved problematic, particularly in
Western societies [63,178]. In the absence of other alternatives
to augment manual contact tracing and given the uncertainty
regarding DCTA effectiveness, a key feature of the IDCTA
should be harm minimization [53]. As summarized in Textbox
1, this includes minimizing the risk to personal data and privacy,
and minimizing the risk of the false characterization of contact
status.
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Textbox 1. Potential risks of digital contact tracing apps.
Data protection
• Failure to protect personal data from misuse [64,65]
Privacy
• Loss of personal privacy with no personal or societal benefit [59,61,66,176]
Resources
• Misuse of limited financial and human resources on an ineffective intervention [67,68]
Clinical
• False-positive characterization of contact status (may result in unnecessary quarantining and anxiety) [69,70]
• False-negative characterization of contact status (may result in further onward disease transmission) [69,70]
Public engagement
• Loss of trust in public health authorities and public health measures [14,56,66]
The IDCTA should be voluntary and consent-based according
to the WHO and ECDC ethical guidance on DCTAs, and this
view is also prevalent in the academic literature [40,51-55]. For
voluntary DCTAs, ensuring transparency and trustworthiness
is important to maximize population penetration [52,53,71-79].
Transparency can be achieved by making the underlying DCTA
algorithms open source [52,80,81], and this is established as
best practice [82,83]. Similarly, an explanation of the risk
prediction algorithm used should be publicly available for
scrutiny [52] as has been done by Germany’s Corona-Warn-App
[179]. The data processed by the IDCTA, including the type,
purpose, and duration of data storage, should be presented in
an accessible, transparent way for all DCTA users [52,80,81].
Trustworthiness (how trusted a DCTA is by the target
population) depends not only on transparency, robust data
protection, and privacy preservation [37,72,84,85] but also on
having published guiding ethical principles [86], a defined
timeline and plan for DCTA evaluation, a defined published
criteria for DCTA deactivation, and a DCTA independent
oversight committee that has representation from civic society
and the public [15,51,52].
DCTA availability and accessibility must be equitable, and they
should not be used in a discriminatory way [52,56,66,87,175].
This is important not only from a human rights perspective but
also from an effectiveness perspective because the success of
a DCTA depends on factors such as user penetration within the
general population [88] and in high-risk population groups
[15,89]. The IDCTA should be disseminated free of charge, so
it is accessible by all societal groups but, in particular, those
disproportionately affected by COVID-19 such as older adults,
people of lower socioeconomic class, and ethnic minorities
[51,52,56,61,90,91]. Smartphone technology may be
inaccessible to people of low incomes or those with limited
digital literacy [92]. In Singapore, Bluetooth-enabled contact
tracing tokens have been distributed to older adults who were
less likely to be smartphone owners [93]. This practice should
be encouraged, and alternatives such as free smartphones or
monofunctional digital contact tracing devices should be
deployed in parallel to groups who may not otherwise have
access to DCTAs [14,94,95].
User Experience Considerations
The IDCTA should be designed so that it synchronizes two
independent environments, that of public health authorities and
that of end users. DCTA user experience considerations can be
thought of as those relating to universality and those relating to
user engagement. Multimedia Appendix 7
[29,32,36,38,39,42,69,96-104,106,107,110-118,180-182]
provides an overview of the key academic literature [75,96-105],
gray literature [106,107], regulations [42,108-111], guidelines
[112,113,180], and assessments of existing DCTAs
[29,32,38,114-118] that support these recommendations.
To support a more holistic approach to the design of the IDCTA,
the concept of universality allowed the cross-disciplinary team
to identify a series of dimensions to be taken into account, such
as accessibility, minors as users, cultural universality, content,
availability, and maintenance and frequency of upgrades with
the aim of better accommodating different users’ needs,
including minors, older adults, people with chronic disease, and
those with various forms of disability, so that accessibility and
inclusiveness can be ensured [42]. In keeping with this holistic
approach to the design of the IDCTA, the interface elements
should enable multimodal interaction (eg, supported by voice
control) with contents that are available in different languages.
Additionally, jargon should be avoided. How well the
dimensions of universality are incorporated into the design of
the IDCTA will affect not only its population penetration and
continued use but also its interoperability across borders.
Population penetration will depend on the prevalence of
smartphones and operating systems in use among the target
population that support the chosen DCTA technology [75,105].
Trade-offs between accuracy and availability will need to be
assessed so that it is available on the widest range of
smartphones and operating systems possible (eg, ultra-wideband
is accurate but not widely available [183,184] and Bluetooth
LE is less accurate but more widely available [119,120,185]).
This must be done while also supporting the various screen
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sizes and resolutions of the widest range of smartphones in use
among the population. The IDCTA should be conceived as
open-ended with frequent updates, ongoing support, and constant
maintenance.
Regarding user engagement, nine key aspects were identified
from across the literature that could help improve engagement:
performance feedback, helpfulness, public health measures,
educational information, personal information, personalization
and control, time and human effort, flexibility or multimodality,
and multitasking. Based on these aspects, user requirements
that could increase engagement are evident. Engagement could
be potentially enhanced by enabling the user to contact their
case health care worker should they have questions regarding
their COVID-19 diagnosis. Engagement could also potentially
be enhanced by allowing users to identify areas where the
incidence of COVID-19 infection is high that they may wish to
avoid or settings where the risk of contracting COVID-19 when
exposed may be highest (eg, public transport routes known to
be frequently crowded). Dynamic, consistently updated
information on confirmed cases, testing sites, vaccination sites,
government restrictions, and preventive strategies could enhance
user engagement by making the benefit of using the app more
apparent to the users and integrating it with the wider public
health information campaign as part of the national COVID-19
response. However, the amount of information presented should
not be overwhelming for users. Graphic representation of these
data may also be beneficial (eg, visualization may summarize
the number of cases or close contacts being reported per day or
week). By conveniently providing useful information on the
DCTA, it has the potential to engage and help users long-term
to protect themselves against COVID-19. The IDCTA should
also enable the end user to tailor the app to their particular needs
to enhance user engagement. For example, users might find it
beneficial to personalize which notifications they receive or to
temporarily deactivate the contact tracing function [121].
Privacy and Data Protection Considerations
Privacy and data considerations of DCTAs are dependent on
what their functional requirements are. DCTAs need to maintain
a contact log, generate a contact alert, and link users with the
test and trace system. The IDCTA needs to perform these
functions while respecting individual privacy rights and adhering
to data protection regulation [14,22,37,40-42,52,56,
69,72,74-76,84,122-124]. The European Charter of Human
Rights Article 8 states that individuals have a right to respect
for private life, but interference with this right can occur if it is
deemed necessary, proportionate, and in accordance with the
law [186]. The IDCTA should follow the foundational principles
of privacy by design, a widely used approach in systems
engineering characterized by proactive rather than reactive
measures, and this approach to digital contact tracing is
supported by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) [125].
The collection and use of personal data are protected by several
regulations in the European Union, such as the European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Act 2016 and the
ePrivacy Directive 2002 [126,187]. Article 6 of the GDPR states
that processing of data is lawful if it is “necessary to protect the
vital interests of a person” and if it is “necessary for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest” [187].
Contact tracing of infectious diseases is lawful because it is
necessary to protect case contacts, and epidemic containment
is certainly carried out in the public interest, a view which is
supported by the WHO and ECDC [5,40]. Data concerning
health such as one’s COVID-19 infection or contact status are
considered “special data” as described in Article 9 of the GDPR
[187]. The processing of “special data” is permissible only
where “processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public
interest,” which shall be “proportionate to the aim pursued” and
respects “the essence of the right to data protection” [187]. More
specifically, special data may be processed if it is “necessary
for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such
as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or
ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care”
[187]. As further explained in recital (46) of the GDPR, the
processing of personal data should also be regarded to be lawful
where it is necessary to protect an interest that is essential for
the life of the data subject or that of another natural person, for
instance, when processing is for monitoring epidemics [127].
Evidently, data collection and processing to facilitate contact
tracing during an epidemic to prevent further disease
transmission and death is permissible. There are limits to this
as defined in Article 5 of the GDPR, which sets out seven key
principles related to the processing of personal data (Textbox
2) [128].
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Textbox 2. Principles of data protection.
Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency
• Lawfulness: Processing of personal data carried out by a controller must have a legal basis under the General Data Protection Regulation.
• Fairness: Processing of personal data must be fair toward the individual whose personal data are concerned and avoid being unduly detrimental,
unexpected, misleading, or deceptive.
• Transparency: Controllers must provide individuals with information regarding the processing of their personal data in a format that is concise,
easily accessible, and easy to understand.
Purpose limitation
• Personal data must be collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes.
Data minimization
• Personal data that are collected and processed should be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are
processed.
Accuracy
• Personal data that are collected should be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
Storage limitation
• Controllers must hold personal data, in a form that permits the identification of individuals, for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the personal data are processed.
Integrity and confidentiality
• Personal data must be processed by controllers only in a manner that ensures the appropriate level of security and confidentiality for the personal
data using appropriate technical or organizational measures.
Accountability
• Controllers are responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate compliance with, the other principles of data protection.
To be lawful, there must be a legal basis on which the data are
processed [109]. For example, in the ROI, a DCTA was
introduced on the legal basis set out under section 7 of the
Health Act 2004, which states that health authorities should use
its resources to protect the health and welfare of the public [185].
Use of the IDCTA should be voluntary, and this should be
included in legal frameworks when legislating for its use
[40,51-55]. To ensure accountability, the controller of the DCTA
should be clearly defined and the EDPB suggest this could be
national public health authorities [41].
DCTA contact logs should adhere to the principles of privacy
by design and data minimization by collecting only an
anonymized identifier unique to each contact event [41]. This
means the IDCTA should not record the name, age, sex,
ethnicity, or address of the contact nor should it record the time
or location of the contact event [41]. However, privacy needs
to be embedded into the DCTA design without diminishing
functionality as much as is possible [125]. To enable risk
stratification of the contact event, the IDCTA should record the
day of the contact event, as is done by the Corona-Warn-App
[179]. Although collection of location data is recommended
against by the EDPB, in the ROI and the United Kingdom, there
is some evidence that the majority of people do not have an
objection to its use by DCTAs in the context of an epidemic
[37,121,129]. Although this may vary between countries, where
location tracking is deemed a proportionate response to the scale
of the epidemic, the IDCTA should log the location of the app
user locally [121] but not that of their contacts in keeping with
privacy by design principles [125]. The principle of purpose
limitation [128] would dictate that both contact and location
tracking logs should be collected only for the purpose of
COVID-19 contact tracing. How a contact event is recorded by
a DCTA must be accurate; otherwise, there is the potential for
large-scale misclassification of contact events as occurred with
the UK NHS COVID-19 app [34,35]. Therefore, field studies
that validate the accuracy of the app should be performed and
published as has been done for some DCTAs [130]. In the ROI,
independent assessments of COVID Tracker have been
performed and published, and this practice should be encouraged
[131,132]. Contact logs should be maintained for 14 days, the
incubation period of COVID-19 [3], to adhere to the principle
of storage limitation.
When a DCTA user is confirmed to have COVID-19, an
exposure notification system is necessary to enable them to alert
their contacts. To ensure data collected are accurate, it has been
suggested that COIVD-19 cases have their status verified before
they can use the exposure notification system to prevent misuse
[133,134]. Verification should preferably be automated [135].
To ensure integrity and confidentiality, the EDPB [41] and
European Union eHealth Network [42] recommend that contact
log processing follow a decentralized privacy preserving
protocol (ie, processing of contact logs to match those of the
user’s contacts with those of cases that occurs on the user’s
device). The principle of privacy by design [125] would dictate
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that contact alerts should be generated from the contact’s DCTA
as opposed to being sent from the case’s DCTA. The contact
alert, to be adherent to the principle of data minimization, should
not contain the cases’ personal information such as name, age,
sex, or ethnicity nor should it contain the time or location of
the contact event [41]. For example, contact alerts generated by
COVID Tracker in the ROI inform users “Close Contact Alert:
The app has detected that you have been in close contact with
someone who has tested positive for COVID-19” [29]. When
a contact alert is generated, the DCTA user should be able to
contact public health authorities through the app [32], or they
should be provided with a number to contact health authorities
on.
In some countries such as South Korea and Israel, interference
with individual privacy rights was deemed to be a necessary
proportionate response to COVID-19. However, Western
societies particularly value privacy [37,136]. Maximizing
population penetration of a voluntary DCTA in these societies
will require health authorities to convince target users that their
privacy will be protected [68,72,77,137]. The nature of data
collected, whether it be proximity data, location data, or both,
hinges on whether it is deemed to be proportionate to the aim
pursued. The EDPB state that DCTAs should rely on proximity
and not location data [41]. Many countries such as the ROI, the
United Kingdom, and Germany have developed DCTAs that
record proximity using Bluetooth LE [29,34,179]. However,
from the experiences of Israel and South Korea, location
tracking may be a key feature of effective digital contact tracing.
Tracking location may be useful to identify previously unknown
settings where transmission is occurring, allowing for public
health authorities to take proactive action to prevent further
transmission [25,138,139]. However, the privacy risks are
significant, and misuse of location data can be harmful to public
trust in health authorities [23]. There is a need for public
engagement mechanisms in each country to define by consensus
what the limits of a proportionate response to COVID-19 are.
Where location tracking is used, it should be an opt-in feature
[121] because invasion of personal privacy can be a significant
deterrent to downloading and using a DCTA, and the use of
geolocation data has recently been the cause of privacy losing
events associated with app use [85,140].
In May 2020, Google and Apple collaborated to create an
application programming interface (API) [141]. An API is a
Lego block on which governments can build a DCTA. The
DCTA (interface, data collection, public health information),
server (epidemiological dashboard, diagnosis verification), and
server relay (for 14 days of the case’s cryptogenic keys) are
supplied by the public health authority [141]. The Google/Apple
API works on Android 6 and iOS 13 forward [141]. Building
a DCTA on this API requires a series of measures to protect
individual privacy. There should be a requirement for explicit
user consent, anonymity of all users to each other, and allowing
users the choice of how much personal information they share
[81,141]. Google and Apple control which DCTAs use the API
and for how long the API is operational in a given region [141].
There should be an agreed timeline and criteria for when the
API and DCTA infrastructure is to be dismantled
[76,121,124,141] because there are significant privacy concerns
that technology companies and governments could use DCTAs
to enable greater surveillance after the pandemic
[26,37,65,66,76]. Using an API comes with the risk that personal
data may be misused or processed unlawfully. Google has a
record of not adhering to data protection regulations and the
principles of data protection [188]. There are also ongoing
concerns regarding Google’s lawful and transparent use of
location data [189]. The entry of private corporations into
pandemic response may create a dependency on them to deliver
public health necessities, global health policies, and result in
an accumulation of decision-making powers across multiple
aspects of society and subversion of democratically elected
governments [59,176]. Despite concerns surrounding the role
of private corporations in digital contact tracing, the number of
app downloads was high [37,190]. This may be explained by
the phenomenon known as the privacy paradox, whereby people
express concerns regarding sharing personal information, but
their behavior is incongruent with the concerns they express
[142].
Technical Considerations
For the IDCTA, the choice of which technology to use to detect
contact events will be influenced by its cost, energy use,
accuracy, availability, accessibility, adherence to data protection
regulation, and by how it effects privacy preservation and overall
DCTA effectiveness [14,17,37,40,42,52,61,69,76,141]. These
in turn influence DCTA population penetration. Potential
technologies include ultra-wideband technology, Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth LE, ultrasound, and GPS (Table 1). Ultra-wideband
technology is an ideal technology for proximity detection. It is
a low cost, low energy use technology that can measure highly
accurate spatial data both indoors and outdoors, with an ability
to discriminate distances of 10 to 30 cm [143,183,184]. With
regard to privacy, it is considered more secure than Bluetooth
LE [143]. However, smartphones equipped with this technology
are not yet in common use [184]. A DCTA that uses Wi-Fi
would be limited by range and difficult to make ubiquitously
available. According to the EDPB and the European Union
eHealth guidance, Bluetooth LE proximity detection should be
used because it maximizes privacy preservation and is widely
available, which are important to maximize population
penetration [41,42,119]. However, population penetration will
also rely on belief in the accuracy of the DCTA to detect contact
events [79,105,144,145]. DCTAs that use Bluetooth LE alone
may not have adequate accuracy [70,132,146,147,185]. GPS
location tracking may be less accurate indoors or in multistory
buildings as compared with Bluetooth LE [44,148]. Published
studies validating the accuracy of these DCTA technologies are
lacking (Table 1). Combining ultrasound technology with
Bluetooth LE may improve accuracy by reducing the number
of false-positive contacts identified [116,130]. In the absence
of widely available ultra-wideband technology, this represents
the best compromise on privacy preservation, accuracy, and
availability for the IDCTA. However, this may not be applicable
across all countries because the choice of technology will depend
on the prevalence of compatible smartphones in use in the
population and how valued personal privacy is among the
population.
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Table 1. Potential DCTA technologies and the implications of their use.
Ultra-widebandBluetooth LE and ultrasoundGPS-enabled geolocation
tracking
Bluetooth LEbDCTAa technology
Highly accurate [143]Accuracy reported as 55%
(distance threshold ≤6 foot)
and accuracy reported as
99.6% (distance threshold ≤12
foot) [130]
Accurate to within 4.9 m, but
concerns that GPS location
tracking for COVID-19 contact
tracing not feasible due to limit-
ed accuracy [149,191]
Accuracy reported as 72%d (dis-
tance threshold not reported) and
79% (distance threshold 1.5 m);
although, independent studies did
not reproduce these results
[70,147,185].
Accuracyc
No instances of ultra-
wideband–enabled
DCTAs found in the
literature.
Insufficient evidence found to
suggest effectiveness
Limited anecdotal evidence to
suggest effectiveness [25,138]
Limited evidence to suggest ef-
fectiveness [150,151]
Effectiveness in augment-
ing manual contact trac-
ing
Low energy use [143]Not reportedMore than Bluetooth LE [148]Less than GPS [148]Energy use
Not widely available
[143,183,184]
Widely available but less so
than Bluetooth LE or GPS







Less adherent (records location,
which is potentially identifi-
able)




AdherentAdherentInterferes with the principle of
data minimization
AdherentAdherence with princi-
ples of data protection
aDCTA: digital contact tracing app.
bLE: Low Energy.
c(True positives + true negatives) / total number of tests.
dCOVID Tracker Ireland reported being able to accurately identify 72% of close contacts, although field studies supporting this claim have not been
published.
ePerception that it has the potential for misuse of audio data [152], but this is not the case according to proponents of this technology [153].
The IDCTA must enable users to exchange and record temporary
contact numbers when they are in contact within prespecified
time and distance thresholds [44,154]. Temporary contact
numbers should be renewed frequently (eg, every 15 minutes)
to protect user privacy [44,141,154]. Contact logs of temporary
contact numbers are maintained by each device, and once a case
of COVID-19 is diagnosed, the DCTA allows them to notify
their contacts [44,141]. How contact logs are processed to
identify contacts and how contacts are alerted can be performed
in a centralized or decentralized manner (Figure 2). Early in the
pandemic, two predominant protocols emerged, the
Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT
initiative; centralized) and the Decentralized Privacy Preserving
Proximity Tracing (DP-3T initiative; decentralized) [155,156].
With the PEPP-PT initiative, contact logs from the case’s device
are processed centrally, while with the DP-3T initiative, contact
logs are processed on the contact’s device by regularly checking
a central server that holds the temporary contact numbers of
cases [155,156]. The DP-3T initiative provides more protection
to individual privacy and may enhance DCTA uptake [155,157].
The PEPP-PT initiative involves a human-in-the-loop, which
is disadvantageous because it shares the case’s contact log with
another individual. However, this may minimize false positives
related to contact occurring through apartment walls or where
adequate contact precautions were in place [156]. Centralized
collection of personal data leaves individuals vulnerable to
social network mapping and potentially having their movements
mapped. Decentralized protocols may also be vulnerable to
malicious attacks [133]. A user’s temporary contact number
could be accessed and used by multiple devices and result in
false contact chains being generated during the life cycle of that
temporary contact number.
Ensuring processes that protect personal data from misuse are
rigorously enforced is important in building public confidence
that their personal data are safe. The European Union has stated
that a DCTA should use a decentralized model to protect
individual privacy [42]. They also emphasized that DCTAs
should augment and not replace existing contact tracing systems
[42]. Automated contact alert notification using a decentralized
protocol may be alarming for contacts to receive. Therefore,
the IDCTA should not only follow a decentralized privacy
preserving protocol but also provide explicit instruction on what
actions to take if a contact alert is received and a means of
making contact with a health care worker for integration into
the test and trace system.
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Figure 2. Centralized versus decentralized digital contact tracing. Reprinted from Hernández-Orallo et al [192] under the Creative Commons CC-BY
4.0 license.
How a contact is defined by the app should also be considered.
DCTAs may define contacts according to binary distance (eg,
within 2 m) and duration of contact (eg, 15 minutes or less)
thresholds in keeping with the definition applied by health
authorities [8,158,159]; although, this binary definition may
not identify all contacts at risk of infection [160]. Alternatively,
a risk-stratified approach that includes other factors associated
with disease transmission may identify contacts more accurately
[34]. Contact could be stratified as high risk or low risk
depending on a risk score, with high-risk contacts being advised
to quarantine and arrange COVID-19 testing and low-risk
contacts being advised on good social distancing practice. Risk
scores could be based on how close the contact was, for how
long the contact lasted, how long it has been since the user met
a COVID-19–positive person, and the risk of transmission for
the case [161]. The risk of transmission would be based on
empirical evidence of COVID-19 transmission dynamics.
Temporary contact numbers recorded in the case’s DCTA each
day would be assigned an additional code that represents the
risk value of COVID-19 transmission from the case on that day.
The contact’s DCTA would, in addition to recording the
temporary contact number, record this additional code so that
it may calculate the COVID-19 risk score when it matches
temporary contact numbers from its contact log with that of a
case. Risk scores are only as accurate as the data they are
constructed from, and defining the risk score threshold would
require an ongoing process of evaluation and calibration [42].
To calibrate the DCTA risk score effectively, knowledge of the
contact event outcomes would be needed. To do this, the IDCTA
would allow users to voluntarily have their COVID-19 test
result uploaded directly to their DCTA from the processing
laboratory (as is possible with the Corona-Warn app [115]) or
for users to voluntarily confirm their status as having COVID-19
on the DCTA (as occurs with COVID Tracker [29] and COCOA
[134]). The DCTA would have to centrally collect for users
who receive a contact alert and who volunteer their COVID-19
test result, how long ago the contact occurred, the duration of
contact, and the proximity of contact.
Clinical and Societal Considerations
COVID-19 transmission chain disruption could potentially be
enhanced by using DCTAs to augment manual contact tracing
[16]. Therefore, this is the aim of the IDCTA. Other aims may
be to act as a confidence-enhancing measure for those most
vulnerable to COVID-19 infection. It may reassure them that
they have not been a contact, and others can demonstrate their
contact-free status to them [162]. The higher the uptake of the
IDCTA, the more likely it is a case can notify a contact of their
exposure. To achieve this, demonstrating to the target population
the high degree of privacy preservation and adherence to data
protection regulation is important. Enhancing uptake through
small monetary incentives may also be considered [163,164].
The IDCTA should be voluntary [40,51-55,134], and mandating
the use of DCTAs of uncertain effectiveness with associated
potential harms, which have the highest likelihood of utility
during periods of low COVID-19 incidence, may be difficult
to justify as a proportionate response.
The IDCTA should avoid functions that necessitate additional
data processing that may raise privacy concerns, such as age,
sex, location, or ethnicity. Any additional functions should be
justifiable, proportionate, privacy preserving, and adherent to
data protection regulation. Additional functions should be
defined before DCTA deployment in keeping with the data
protection principle of purpose limitation [128]. DCTAs present
an opportunity to perform functions such as allowing people to
assess their personal risk of being hospitalized or dying from
COVID-19. Providing risk assessments may not be ethical given
that risk algorithms may be population specific, not
generalizable, and may provide falsely elevated or falsely
lowered risks [165]. Regardless of risk, it could be argued that
the person’s behavior should be the same and an awareness of
one’s risk may not result in positive behavior change. Therefore,
the IDCTA would not provide risk assessments. Symptom
checker functions should also be avoided because there is little
high-quality evidence to support their use in this context.
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To be ethical and adherent with data protection regulation, the
continued use of a DCTA needs to be supported by evidence
that it has been effective in contributing to epidemic control. A
DCTA is a multistep intervention. There are several steps where
they may fail to effectively disrupt transmission chains,
including being downloaded; recording contact events; sending
contact alerts; and integrating with the wider contact tracing,
testing, quarantine, and isolation systems [16,166]. Maintaining
privacy while ensuring the necessary data to demonstrate
effectiveness are collected is challenging. To enable evaluation
of effectiveness, the IDCTA should record and collect key
metrics (Table 2). These were derived from ECDC guidance
on how to monitor contact tracing effectiveness [159], the
limited number of studies evaluating real-world DCTA
effectiveness [150,151,167-170], and other published academic
literature [62]. Many of these metrics may be collected by the
app and do not interfere with individual privacy. Other metrics
such as the outcome of COVID-19 testing would be considered
sensitive data by many. Collection of these sensitive data should
be voluntary. Determining whether people who receive contact
alerts quarantine, a key intervention in disrupting transmission
changes, may be difficult. This is true for both digital and
manual contact tracing. GPS location tracking has been used in
China by public health authorities to confirm contacts remain
within quarantine [171]. However, this interference with the
right to privacy would likely not be acceptable in countries
where privacy is highly valued. The outcomes of the evaluation
should be openly reported to allow for a wider public evaluation
of the app.
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Table 2. Metrics to evaluate ideal DCTA effectiveness.
Metric denominator (source)Metric numerator (source)PurposeIndicator of effective-
ness
Number of smartphone owners nationally
(Government statistics office; eg, Central
Statistics Office, ROIb)
Number of DCTA downloads minus number
of DCTA deletions (DCTA)
To estimate the proportion of
the smartphone owning popula-
tion who download the DCTA
DCTAa is downloaded
Number of DCTAs downloaded minus num-
ber of DCTAs deleted (DCTA)
Number of DCTAs with contact tracing
turned on (DCTA)
To estimate the proportion of
DCTAs downloaded that are
being used
DCTA is active
N/AcFrequency and duration of use (DCTA)To estimate the proportion of
DCTAs downloaded that are
being used
DCTA is active
Number of DCTAs downloaded minus num-
ber of DCTAs deleted (DCTA)
Number of DCTAs downloading TCNsd of
cases on central server per day (assuming
DCTA downloads keys once per day when
active; DCTA)
To estimate the proportion of
DCTAs downloaded that are
being used
DCTA is active
Number of COVID-19 cases nationally (na-
tional surveillance data)
Number of positive test results uploaded to
DCTA (DCTA)
To estimate the DCTA penetra-
tion among people who con-
tract COVID-19
DCTA is used by
COVID-19 cases
Number of COVID-19 cases who attended a
screening center (screening center data)
Number of COVID-19 cases who attended
a screening center reporting DCTA active
use (survey of attendees at testing centers
and review of participants’ test results)
To estimate the DCTA penetra-
tion among people who con-
tract COVID-19
DCTA is used by
COVID-19 cases
Number of DCTAs with a positive COVID-
19 test recorded (national surveillance data)
Number of DCTAs that send a contact alert
(DCTA)
To estimate the proportion of
cases using the DCTA who use
it to send contact alerts
DCTA is used by
COVID-19 cases to no-
tify close contacts
Number of COVID-19 cases who attended a
screening center reporting DCTA active use
(survey of attendees at testing centers and
review of participants’ test results)
Number of COVID-19 cases who attended
a screening center reporting DCTA active
use and who report sending a contact alert
(follow-up survey of COVID-19 cases who
reported DCTA use at time of screening)
To estimate the proportion of
cases using the DCTA who use
it to send contact alerts
DCTA is used by
COVID-19 cases to no-
tify close contacts
Number of close contacts identified nationally
(national surveillance data)
Number of DCTAs that receive a contact
alert (DCTA)
To estimate the DCTA penetra-




Number of close contacts attending testing
center (survey of attendees at testing centers)
Number of close contacts attending testing
center identified exclusively by DCTA
(survey of attendees at testing centers)
To demonstrate the DCTA
augments manual contact trac-
ing
DCTA identifies con-
tacts not identified by
manual contact tracing
Number of close contacts attending testing
center (survey of attendees at testing centers)
Number of close contacts attending testing
center who received contact alert from DC-
TA before contact alert from manual contact
tracing service (survey of attendees at test-
ing centers)
To demonstrate the DCTA
augments manual contact trac-
ing
DCTA identifies con-
tacts sooner than manu-
al contact tracing
Number of DCTAs that receive a contact alert
(DCTA)
Number of DCTAs with a COVID-19 test
result uploaded within 14 days of a contact
alert (DCTA)
To estimate the proportion of
contacts who are tested for
COVID-19 and to estimate the
number of cases identified by
the DCTA
Close contacts using
DCTA are tested for
COVID-19
N/AN/A (qualitative survey of DCTA users)To determine what harms, if
any, occur with DCTA use
DCTA associated harm
is recognized
aDCTA: digital contact tracing app.
bROI: Republic of Ireland.
cN/A: not applicable.
dTCN: temporary contact number.
Summary of Findings
Key considerations were ethical, user experience, privacy and
data protection, clinical and societal, and evaluation.
Proportionality, voluntariness, transparency, trustworthiness,
and equity are necessary for the design and deployment of the
IDCTA. Universality and user engagement are important user
experience considerations that can influence DCTA use in the
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population. Dimensions of universality that should be taken
into account when designing the IDCTA are accessibility,
minors as users, cultural universality, content, availability, and
maintenance and frequency of upgrades. User engagement could
be enhanced by small financial incentives, enabling users to
tailor aspects of the app to their particular needs and integrating
DCTAs into the wider public health information campaign. If
DCTAs are to be trusted, accepted, and used by the target
population, they must be adherent to data protection regulation
and have privacy by design through all elements, including
maintaining contact logs, generating contact alerts, and linking
users into the test and trace system. For the IDCTA, the choice
of which technology is used will be influenced by its cost,
energy use, availability, accessibility, adherence to data
protection regulation and principles of privacy by design, and
accuracy when detecting contact events. Combining ultrasound
technology with Bluetooth LE may improve accuracy by
reducing the number of false-positive contacts identified. A
decentralized privacy preserving protocol should be followed
to enable DCTA users to exchange and record temporary contact
numbers during contact events. The IDCTA should define and
risk stratify contact events according to proximity, duration of
contact, and the infectiousness of the case at the time of contact.
Evaluating DCTAs requires data to quantify app downloads,
use among COVID-19 cases, successful contact alert generation,
contact alert receivers, contact alert receivers that adhere to
quarantine and testing recommendations, and the number of




This cross-disciplinary review presents best practice guidance
for developing the IDCTA and is informative for those involved
in DCTA research, design, and deployment. It also serves as a
comprehensive and accessible entry point for those beginning
to engage with this research subject, which has evolved
significantly after a period of intensive exploration in 2020.
DCTAs will likely be a significant research field not only for
the remainder of the COVID-19 pandemic but also in the
postpandemic era because of a renewed interest and support for
pandemic preparedness. Demonstrating the effectiveness of
COVID-19 DCTAs is a current research priority [193]. This is
important to convince not only nonapp users of their benefits
but also current or previous app users, many of whom remain
uncertain about their utility [194]. Early evidence indicates that
DCTAs can identify contacts of COVID-19 cases who
subsequently develop infection (particularly among
nonhousehold contacts) [150,151,167-170], may shorten the
time to quarantine by 1 day [168], and can prevent further
disease transmission [169]. Ensuring DCTAs are integrated
with the wider test and trace system is emerging as an important
aspect of DCTA deployment [135]. Where codes were required
by DCTA users to confirm on the app a COVID-19–infected
status, manual distribution of these codes by health care
professionals could delay contact alert generation and
subsequent downstream actions such as contact quarantine and
testing, suggesting automated code generation is preferable
[135].
A weakness of this research was that it did not specifically
address how DCTAs should be integrated into the wider test
and trace system. There is a need for future dedicated research
to synthesize and evaluate evidence, and generate best practice
recommendations for this consideration of DCTA deployment.
The limitations of this review are that the index and gray
literature searches, while extensive, were not performed using
systematic review methodology. The inclusion of both indexed
and gray literature enabled the derivation of best practice
guidance from the literature during a phase of rapid DCTA
research and development growth. The cross-disciplinary
approach taken to evaluating the evidence was a strength of this
research because it allowed varying aspects of DCTA design
and deployment to be considered.
Future promising developments in this field may be the use of
blockchain technology, ultra-wideband technology, and artificial
intelligence in DCTA design. Privacy and data protection
concerns are significant barriers to DCTA uptake in Western
societies [72,74-76,122-124]. A blockchain network is a
decentralized, distributed, and secure public ledger that stores
records of transactions securely using cryptography techniques
[195]. Features of blockchain technology that make it
advantageous for digital contact tracing are decentralized data
storage; data security through encryption; data provenance and
time stamping allowing for verification of the data legitimacy
and data immutability, which enhances data reliability and
transparency [196]. The use of blockchain networks in future
DCTAs may reduce privacy and data protection concerns and
enhance DCTA uptake and use [196]. This area should be a
focus of future research. DCTAs need to detect contact events
accurately to optimize uptake [79,105,144,145]. Ultra-wideband
is a low energy means of enabling short-range high bandwidth
communications that can transmit data with minimal noise
interference. This could allow for highly accurate measurement
of contact events within centimeters [197]. Although not yet a
feature of most smartphones, it most likely will be in the near
future [198]. Therefore, it could be a viably accessible and
available energy efficient technology for DCTAs in future
pandemics. Additionally, artificial intelligence could potentially
improve the accuracy of future DCTA contact event detection
by reducing false positives and false negatives [199].
Conclusion
In conclusion, key considerations and best practice guidance
for the design of the IDCTA were derived from the literature.
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